Joana Mambom v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-9-2012 
Joana Mambom v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Joana Mambom v. Atty Gen USA" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1316. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1316 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-1865 
 ___________ 
 
 JOANA CHI MAMBOM, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                                                                            Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A098-580-310) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 8, 2012 
 Before:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 9, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 On September 25, 2007, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Joana Chi Mambom’s 
request for asylum and associated relief.  Administrative Record (A.R.) 57–58, 318.  
Mambom did not appeal this decision.  Instead, on October 30, 2007, she filed a “Motion 
to Reopen/Reconsider” with the IJ, which was denied on November 15, 2007.  See A.R. 
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106, 299–313.  Mambom appealed this order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 
but was not successful.  See A.R. 2–4, 97–102.   
 This timely petition for review followed.  For the reasons stated below, it will be 
denied. 
I. 
 Mambom, a native and citizen of Cameroon, filed for asylum in August 2004, 
based on abuse she had suffered due to her association with an Anglophone political 
group.  A.R. 425–444.  The application, in turn, brought her to the attention of 
immigration authorities, who charged her with removability under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(1)(B)—specifically, for overstaying her nonimmigrant B-1 visa.  A.R. 491.   
Mambom’s main merits hearing took place on April 7, 2005.  A.R. 147.  During 
the course of the hearing, the Government and IJ expressed concerns over the authenticity 
of certain documents, so the Government elected to pursue an overseas investigation to 
determine their validity.  See, e.g., A.R. 156.  The proceedings were stayed for over two 
years, with periodic hearings to update the IJ on the progress of the investigation.  At the 
final hearing on September 11, 2007, the Government acknowledged that the results had 
still not arrived.  A.R. 291.  Mambom’s counsel then engaged in the following exchange 
with the IJ: 
Counsel: And, Your Honor, I also believe you stated that on May 15th will 
be the last master hearing. If not results heard back from the embassy, you 
would make a decision. 
Judge: (Indiscernible) from the embassy. It makes it a lot easier. All right. 
So that’s what you’re requesting? All testimony is complete, correct? 
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Counsel: Yes, Your Honor. 
Judge: That’s why you’re asking for a decision, correct? 
Counsel: Yes, Your Honor. 
A.R. 293.  The hearing concluded without any further testimony being taken. 
 In an oral decision, the IJ denied Mambom’s request for asylum and derivative 
relief.  Chief among the problems cited in Mambom’s application were numerous 
inconsistencies and omissions, many occurring between her oral testimony and the notes 
from her asylum interview.  See, e.g., A.R. 48 (regarding beatings while in custody).  
Also, given testimony and evidence presented regarding human-rights conditions in 
Cameroon, the IJ found suspect Mambom’s decision to leave her children in the country: 
“[a] mother who is genuinely fearful for her children would have had those three [United 
States Citizen] children in the United States during this four year [application and 
removal] period.”  A.R. 53–54.  Therefore, the IJ made an adverse-credibility 
determination, denying asylum but granting voluntary departure.  A.R. 55–56. 
 Mambom then filed a short motion to reopen/reconsider,1
                                                 
1 While styled as a motion to “reopen and reconsider,” it was filed after the 30-day 
window for reconsideration.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).  
Mambom does not challenge this determination of untimeliness, so we will consider the 
motion as one that requested only reopening of proceedings.  Compare 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.23(b)(2), with § 1003.23(b)(3) (contrasting motions to reopen with motions to 
reconsider).  
 which was based on new 
evidence showing mistreatment suffered by her husband during a visit to Cameroon—a 
visit connected to the unfortunate circumstance of her son Chinje’s untimely death in a 
tragic accident in the United States—inspired by the gendarmes’ suspicion that Mambom 
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herself was also traveling in the country.  A.R. 299–312.  The Government announced its 
opposition, observing that the “new” evidence could have been submitted before the 
close of proceedings.  A.R. 296.  The IJ agreed; Mambom had “failed to explain why this 
evidence was not presented at the time of the [September 2007] hearing.”  A.R. 106.  But 
in December 2007, some time after denying the motion, the IJ amended her original 
opinion to reflect that Mambom’s U.S. citizen children were no longer living in 
Cameroon.  Despite this change in circumstances, “there were so many problems with 
this case that the decision stands with respect to [Mambom’s] credibility.”  A.R. 59. 
 Mambom appealed to the BIA, which “affirm[ed] the [IJ’s] conclusion that 
[Mambom] failed to establish that evidence of her son’s accidental death in June 2007, 
and of her husband’s apparent arrest, interrogation, and mistreatment by police in 
Cameroon later that same month, was not available and could not have been discovered 
or presented at the hearing on September 11, 2007.”  A.R. 2 (citing 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.23(b)(3)).  She had therefore “failed to meet the heavy burden required to warrant 
reopening.” A.R. 3.  The BIA separately declined to exercise its discretion to reopen sua 
sponte, “particularly in light of the prior adverse credibility finding.”  A.R. 3.  Mambom 
petitioned this Court for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Mambom does not argue 
that we can assert jurisdiction over the underlying merits determination of her application 
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for asylum and related relief—which, in any case, she declined to exhaust before the 
BIA.  A decision on the merits and a decision on a related motion to reopen are two 
separate orders, either one of which may be appealed or be the subject of an eventual 
petition for review.  Cf. Castro v. Att’y Gen., No. 10–3234, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 
456530, at *5 (3d Cir. Feb. 14, 2012); Bak v. INS 682 F.2d 441, 442–43 (3d Cir. 1982).  
Accordingly, our jurisdiction is limited to the agency’s denial of her motion to reopen, 
which we review for abuse of discretion.  Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 202 
(3d Cir. 2011).  We may reverse only if the agency’s decision is “arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law.”  Id.    
      III. 
 Mambom advances two arguments in support of her petition.  First, she claims that 
the evidence she presented “was unavailable at the time of the merits hearing in 2005, 
which occurred quite early in the course of” the removal proceedings.  Pet’r’s Br. 22 
(emphasis added).  While acknowledging that other hearings were held after that date, 
Mambom points out that those appearances were not about the merits of her case, but 
rather about the ongoing authentication of her documents.  Mambom also suggests that 
she could not have been aware of the basis of the IJ’s credibility decision, which partly 
relied upon (at the time) out-of-date information about the whereabouts of her United 
States citizen children, until after the opinion had issued. 
 Motions to reopen “will not be granted unless the Immigration Judge is satisfied 
that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have 
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been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3).  
Mambom insists that “former hearing” means “former merits hearing” or “former main 
hearing.”  But she points to no precedent, whether before a Circuit Court or before the 
agency, that would support this reading of the regulation.  See, e.g., Ivanov v. Gonzales, 
487 F.3d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 2007) (interpreting § 1003.23 to mean that the new material 
“must be material and both unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of an earlier 
hearing.”) (emphasis on “an” added; other emphasis as in original).  The BIA saw no 
such distinction; indeed, it observed that Mambom was present at the final hearing, that 
her counsel asked for an expedited ruling, and that her counsel affirmatively represented 
that all testimony was complete.  A.R. 2; see also A.R. 291 (indicating that “[t]he 
respondent is present” at the September 11, 2007 hearing).  Under the applicable 
administrative law canons of deference, see Castro, 2012 WL 456530, at *6, we cannot 
conclude that the BIA’s construction was “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”  Chong v. Dist. Dir. INS, 264 F.3d 378, 389 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Bowles 
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).  
 Mambom’s alternative argument, that she could not have known of the IJ’s 
reliance on the location of her children until after the release of the opinion, is also 
without merit.  As the BIA observed, she was aware that the location of her children 
could be an issue.  A.R. 213.  But more to the point, the IJ indicated in her corrected 
opinion that knowing that three children now resided in the United States would not have 
changed the outcome of the proceedings.  See A.R. 59.  
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 Finally, Mambom claims that the BIA abused its discretion in “not finding that 
[she] had established prima facie eligibility for asylum,” when it “implicitly affirmed the 
adverse credibility finding of the [IJ].”  Pet’r’s Br. 24–25.  We have jurisdiction to review 
the BIA’s use of its sua sponte authority to reopen only if it relies on “an incorrect legal 
premise.”  Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 2011).  But adverse 
credibility determinations are factual findings.  Abulashvili, 663 F.3d at 202.  Thus, to the 
extent that the BIA relied in part upon an otherwise-unchallenged factual issue in 
declining to reopen sua sponte, we lack jurisdiction to review the validity of the adverse 
credibility determination. 
      IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
  
